See Part 1 for Reasons 1-10. Here are reasons 11-20.
- Despite repeated assurances that voting machines are never connected to the Internet, Logan Lamb watches a video on the CES website that instructs poll workers (and demonstrates) how to insert PCMCIA memory cards into Internet connected computers to load them with ballots and other election-related information. Poll workers are instructed to insert those cards into a port on Diebold Accuvote TS voting machines on election day. This establishes a connection between the voting machines and the Internet that would allow their exposure to malware.
- Despite assurances that voting machines cannot be tampered with because they are under the secure, continual physical control of election officials at all times, numerous voters observe the following
unattended voting machines in hallways of public buildings. The receipt shows that the recipient has not signed for these machines and the machines are accessible to anyone.
- Despite repeated assurances that election security is a priority for Georgia elections, an internal Kennesaw State University audit of the Lamb-Grayson breach, concludes that there was “poor understanding” of the risk posed by CES.
- Missing ballots are nothing new in Georgia elections. Reports surface every election cycle about votes that are cast on computerized voting equipment that are never recorded. These range from anecdotes about touchscreen presses that are reversed by the time the summary screen is presented to the voter to legal challenges mounted by candidates (like this one). Georgia’s Secretary of State makes challenges based on illegal tampering even more complex because he has been on a crusade to reduce the size of voter rolls in the state. Nevertheless, election night analysis continues to show that flipping votes on DRE type voting machines is a real risk. Tally records confirm missing ballots:
- It may seem like sour grapes for losing candidates to complain about election night anomalies, but Georgia seems to have more than its fair share of surprises like that. In 2002, for example, Diebold’s voting machines reported the defeat of Democratic senator Max Cleland. Early polls had given the highly popular Cleland a solid lead over his Republican opponent, Saxby Chambliss. Two days before the election, a Zogby poll gave Chambliss a one-point lead among likely voters, while the Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported that Cleland maintained a three-point advantage with the same group. Cleland lost by seven points. In the month leading up to the election, Diebold employees, led by Bob Urosevich, applied a mysterious, uncertified software patch to 5,000 voting machines that Georgia had purchased in May. Popular Governor Roy Barnes lost to Sonny Perdue by somehow blowing an 11 point lead on the eve of the election, and voter turnout anomalies like the one below led many to question the validity of the June 20 election in the 6th District.
- Voter rolls have become a favorite target of election hacks, so when it was reported that five electronic poll books were stolen before the April special election, it caught the eye of cyber security professionals already concerned about the integrity of Georgia elections. The theft was not reported until the eve of the Special Election, and the stolen machines were subsequently found in a dumpster. (Note added July 9: Initial press reports were misleading. They were not found in a dumpster. Later reporting said that the police took the word of the alleged thief that he threw them away. Officials did not think it was worth it to try to recover them. Interestingly enough Secretary of State Brian Kemp threw a party for the police who did not recover the missing poll books).
- Since there were many opportunities for hackers to modify contact information, it is not surprising that voters were turned away from legitimate polling centers:
- Or directed to alternative centers because of an unusually large number of simultaneous renovations to existing centers, thus depressing voter turnout:
- Vague descriptions of what exactly constitutes Georgia’s computerized voting system are useful to deflect questions about what components are certified by whom. A citizens’ request that SoS produce active, valid certifications for the entire system was denied.
- SoS Brian Kemp in published op-ed pieces is openly dismissive of threats to election systems. In particular, he dismisses the threat of Russian hacking as “fake news,” making it difficult to balance threats, vulnerabilities, and security measures. Kemp often declares Georgia’s systems to be absolutely secure, but that is not a great feat if you do not acknowledge any threats.
#protectGAvote and special thanks to Lady Liberty Votes for visual examples..