- An internal analysis by the vendor says the machines are vulnerable to vote changing.
- Data breach in the Secretary of State’s office exposes 6M+ names and personal information of Georgia voters to media outlets and political party offices.
- Secretary of State Karen Handel ignores recommendations for beefing up voting system
- The same voting machines used in Georgia are successfully and repeatedly attacked.
- In a realistic test, Washington DC voting system is hacked: in 48 hours all of the election results were undetectably changed.
- A walkthrough of The Center for Election System at Kennesaw State University (which programs, tests, and maintains the State’s 27,000 voting machines) shows shocking lapses of physical security.
- Cyber security researcher Logan Lamb stumbles into 15GB of sensitive documents that were externally accessible, already indexed by Google. Files included election day passwords, GEMS databases. training videos, and executable files. CES managers warn Lamb to avoid talking to the media or risk being “crushed by powerful people downtown.”
- CES promises to fix the problem, but 6 months later cyber security researcher Chris Grayson finds that the files are still exposed to the Internet.
- Despite assurances that CES is not connected to the public Internet, an internal Kennesaw State audit of the Lamb-Grayson breach find an unlocked data closet at CES wih a public access port to the Internet.
- Despite assurances that CES is not connected to the public Internet, an internal Kennesaw State audit of the Lamb-Grayson breach finds an unauthorized wireless acccess point on premises, providing a channel from internal CES systems to the public Internet.
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